Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/27 : CIA-RDP87M00539R002303820021-8 **EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP** TO: **ACTION INFO** DATE INITIAL 1 DCI 2 DDCI 3 EXDIR. D/ICS 5 DDI DDA X 7 DDO 8 DDS&T Chm/NIC 10 GC 11 |IG 12 Compt 13 D/Pers 14 D/OLL 15 D/PAO 16 SA/IA AO/DCI 17 C/IPD/OIS 19 NIO/ECON χ 20 21 22 SUSPENSE Date Remarks STAT **Executive Secretary** Jan 85 🐍 3637 (10-81)

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

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CABINET AFFAIRS STAFFING MEMORANDUM

Date: 1/4/85	Number:	16911	lCA Due	By:	·	
Subject: Cabinet Counc	il on Eco	nomic A	ffairs Planning	Meeting	- January	8, 1985
8:45 A.M Roosevelt	Room	TOPI	C: Employment Po	licy		
ALL CABINET MEMBERS Vice President State Treasury Defense Attorney General Interior	Action Dialy		CEA CEQ OSTP		Action	FYI
Agriculture Commerce Labor HHS HUD Transportation Energy Education Counsellor OMB CIA UN		40000000000000000000000000000000000000	Baker Deaver Darman (For WH Mc Farlane Svahn —Chapman			
USTR GSA EPA NASA OPM VA SBA	00000		Executive Secretar CCCT CCEA CCFA CCHR CCLP CCMA CCNRE	ry for:		
REMARKS:					7.0	

There will be a Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs Planning Meeting on Tuesday, January 8, 1985, at 8:45 A.M. in the Roosevelt Room.

The agenda and background papers are attached.

RETURN TO:

☐ Craig L. Fuller ☐ Don Clarey ☐ Tom Gibson ☐ Larry Herbolsheimer Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/04/27 : CIA-RDP87M00539R002303820021-8

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 4, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

FROM:

ROGER B. PORTER REP

SUBJECT:

Agenda and Papers for the January 8 Meeting

The agenda and papers for the January 8 meeting of the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs are attached. The meeting is scheduled for 8:45 a.m. in the Roosevelt Room.

The Council is scheduled to continue its consideration of the report of the Working Group on Employment Policy, which last reported to the Council on December 13. The January 8 meeting will focus on three issues:

- 1. The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit
- 2. Summer Youth Employment and Training Program Fund Distribution
- 3. Employment Service Devolution

Papers on the first two topics were distributed on December 11. Copies of them are attached for your convenience.

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

CABINET COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

January 8, 1985

8:45 a.m.

Roosevelt Room

AGENDA

1. Report of the Working Group on Employment Policy (CM# 510)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 11, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

FROM:

THE WORKING GROUP ON EMPLOYMENT POLICY

SUBJECT:

Targeted Jobs Tax Credit Extension

Issue:

Should the Administration support extension of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit program and, if so, should the Administration propose any program changes and how long of an extension should it support?

The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) program is designed to encourage employers to hire disadvantaged individuals from certain target groups and recipients of certain welfare payments. The credit is scheduled to expire December 31, 1985. There will almost certainly be legislative proposals in the 99th Congress to extend it.

Background

The Revenue Act of 1978 created the TJTC for a three-year period expiring on December 31, 1981. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 extended TJTC for one year and the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 extended the program for two additional years to December 31, 1984. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 extended TJTC through December 31, 1985.

As initially enacted, the TJTC provided a tax credit of 50 percent of the first \$6,000 of an eligible employee's wages in the first year of employment and 25 percent in the second year for seven designated groups:

- o Economically disadvantaged youth aged 16-24;
- Economically disadvantaged Vietnam veterans under ace 35;
- o Economically disadvantaged ex-convicts;
- o Recipients of Supplemental Security Income;
- Recipients of general assistance;
- o Students in qualified cooperative education programs.
- o Handicapped persons referred by vocational rehabilitation programs.

In extending the credit, Congress has made several structural changes:

- o Limited eligibility of cooperative education students to those who are economically disadvantaged.
- o Limited the retroactive certification of persons already hired.
- o Added disadvantaged youth for summer jobs as an eligible target group. (This credit is 85 percent of wages up to \$3,000 for the 90-day period beginning May 1 of each year.)
- Removed the age limitation for Vietnam veterans.
- o Added Work Incentive (WIN) program participants and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients as eligible target groups, which had been subjects of a separate credit.
- o Removed Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) public service employees who were laid off as an eligible target group.

State employment service agencies administer the TJTC and certify individual workers for qualification in specific target groups. The Internal Revenue Service is responsible for the applicable regulations.

The scope of the program has expanded substantially since it was enacted in 1978. The number of TJTC certificates issued is as follows:

Fiscal year	Certifications	Percent change
1979 .	37,020	NA NA
1980	305,743	· NA
1981 1982 .	411,581	34.6
1982 .	202,261	-50.8
1984 (estimated)	397,644* 508,500*	96.6 29.8
	545,500	47.0

^{*} Excludes summer youth certifications: 33,538 in 1983; 27,600 in 1984.

The substantial decline in certifications in EY 1982 waz largely due to the elimination of non-disadvantaged cooperative education students as an eligible group. The limitations on retroactive certifications also contributed to the decline in certifications.

Economically disadvantaged youth, the largest target group, accounted for 62 percent of TJTC jobs obtained in the first three quarters of FY 1984. In addition, a substantial number of youth obtained jobs through the summer youth TJTC program.

AFDC recipients accounted for 16 percent of TJTC jobs. Attachment 1 outlines the number of certifications for each target group.

About 42 percent (30 percent black and 12 percent other) of those individuals obtaining jobs under the TJTC were from minority groups. In addition, 56 percent of those certified were male and 76 percent were under 24 years old. Attachment 2 outlines the demographic composition of TJTC participants.

Over 40 percent of the jobs for which individuals were hired under the credit were in service occupations. The next highest proportion of jobs was in clerical and sales occupations (19 percent). Attachment 3 outlines the distribution of occupations among TJTC participants.

Program Effectiveness

There is no definitive measure of the net employment impact of TJTC on participants. The relevant criteria for judging the program include:

- o To what extent does the TJTC act as a tax loophole by permitting employers to claim the tax credit from hiring persons they would have hired without the credit.
- O To what extent does obtaining a job under the TJTC enhance the likelihood of obtaining permanent, unsubsidized employment?
- To what extent do persons hired from the target groups under the TJTC displace non-target group members. For example, do employers tend to hire disadvantaged youth instead of disadvantaged adults in order to earn the credit?
- o Could the objective of enhancing employment opportunities of youth be met more effectively and at less cost by simply lowering the minimum wage and removing other unnecessary employment barriers?

The Department of Labor has contracted with Macro Systems. Inc. to evaluate the impact of the TJTC. The study will seek testimate the net employment and earnings effects of the credit on the target groups over a period of 15 months after they are hir tand to measure the extent to which the hiring of TJTC-eligible

individuals displaces workers from the non-eligible population. Macro Systems started the study in August 1984 and expects to complete it by the end of 1985.

Budget Implications

TJTC affects the budget in two ways. The more important one, by far, is tax expenditures.

Tax Expenditures. The following table displays estimates of tax
expenditures for TJTC:

Fiscal year	Revenue loss (in \$millions)
1982	235
1983	. 290
1984	465
1985	1000

Budget Outlays. The TJTC increases budget outlays through costs incurred by the Department of Labor in administering it. For fiscal years 1982 through 1985, these administrative costs were about \$20 million annually. The Department is requesting appropriations in FY 1986 of \$35 million. The \$15 million increase is aimed at meeting the high level of employer interest that has developed in the program as economic conditions have continued to improve.

Recent Legislative Proposals

The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 extended the TJTC through December 31, 1985. The Senate-passed version would have extended the TJTC three years, while the House-passed version did not contain an extension. The Conference Committee agreed on a one-year extension, which was supported by the Administration.

A number of other TJTC-related legislative proposals were introduced in the 98th Congress. Some would have extended the program for five years. Others would have added new target groups. A list of these proposals is found at Attachment 4.

Policy Objectives

There are at least two major generic objectives which Table should attempt to meet:

- 1. Increase employment and earnings of target groups by a greater amount than otherwise would have occurred. A tax credit program should increase employment of those groups targeted above that would have taken place in the absence of the the credit. Moreover, a program should increase the likelihood of participants obtaining permanent, unsubsidized employment.
- 2. Achieve greater employment and earnings while minimizing program costs. A jobs program should achieve its employment objectives while minimizing costs. If there are a variety of programs that can achieve the same increase in employment and earnings, the government should choose the program which expends the fewest resources.

Policy Options

There are two basic policy issues that need to be addressed.

Issue 1: Should the Administration support extension of the TJTC?

Option A: Allow the TJTC to expire after December 31, 1985.

<u>Advantages</u>

- While the net employment benefits of the TJTC are uncertain, its costs are certain. Allowing the TJTC to expire would reduce FY 1986 tax expenditures by about \$1.0 billion and reduce budget outlays of about \$35 million in administrative costs. Moreover, expiration would reduce future fiscal year tax expenditures, which would probably increase if the credit were extended.
- o TJTC may provide sizable windfalls to employers who may have hired many individuals even in the absence of the credit.
- The Federal Government already provides much employment and training assistance to youth, especially those who are economically disadvantaged, largely through the JTPA. Moreover, the Administration is proposing the establishment of a Youth Employment Opportunity Wage, which would further help youth, particularly those who are economically disadvantaged.

O Unless the Administration proposes allowing TJTC to expire now, growing support for the program would make the credit permanent.

Disadvantages

- Allowing expiration could be interpreted as a retreat from the Administration policy of encouraging the movement of the economically disadvantaged into private sector jobs.
- Segments of the business community and target groups benefiting from the credit will strongly oppose expiration.
- o Allowing expiration may reduce support for the Administration's youth employment opportunity wage (YEOW) proposal since some groups supporting YEOW may perceive TJTC as a necessary complement to YEOW.

Option B: Propose extending the TJTC for at least two years.

<u>Advantages</u>

- o Proposing extension would affirm the Administration's commitment to the placement of the economically disadvantaged in private sector jobs.
- o The program could be modified to restrict eligibility and limit costs.

<u>Disadvantages</u>

- O Extending the program would result in a revenue loss of about \$1.0 billion in FY 1986 and perhaps more in future fiscal years.
- Given the large projected out-year deficits, it is difficult justifying expending resources on a program with uncertain and unproven benefits, especially when there exists alternative youth employment programs that have demonstrated effectiveness.
- Issue 2: If the Administration supports extension, should it propose any program changes?
- Option A: Propose TJTC extension while: a) limiting the tar:

 groups to economically disadvantaged youth and wel:

 recipients; and/or b) changing the nature of the
 credit, for example, reducing the credit for disadvantaged summer youth from 85 percent of wages to
 percent, the same credit available to other groups.

There are already seven target groups under the TJTC and a number of legislative proposals would, if enacted, add seven more target groups. The expansion of the scope of the credit diminishes its effectiveness as an incentive for hiring the basic group for which it was created: the economically disadvantaged. In addition, the proliferation of target groups makes the TJTC more difficult to administer.

An alternative to the proliferation of target groups would be to reduce the current number of target groups eligible to economically disadvantaged youth and welfare recipients.

Advantages

- A reduction in the number of target groups would assure targeting of resources to those most in need.
- A reduction in the number of target groups and/or a change in the nature of the credit would result in a lower loss of revenue. A direct extrapolation of reducing the number of target groups to economically disadvantaged youth and welfare recipients suggests that the FY 1986 revenue loss would be \$800 million, instead of \$1.0 billion. However, the revenue loss could be greater or less.
- o It would streamline the administration of the program.

Disadvantages'

- o Given the congressional pressure for expanding the scope of the program, proposing a reduction in the scope could alienate support in the Congress for the TJTC itself.
- A reduction would encounter opposition from disqualified target groups.
- O Changing the nature of the credit could reduce the incentive for employers to hire individuals from the targeted groups.

Option B: Propose TJTC extension without amending the credit.

Advantages

o Maintaining the current scope of the program enables the government to target specific groups.

Disadvantages

- o Maintaining the current scope makes it less likely that employers will hire economically disadvantaged youth.
- O It would keep the costs of the program high since the credit would be available to a large number of target groups.

Attachments

Targeted Jobs Tax Credit Certifications
Issued by Target Group: First Three Quarters FY 1984
(October 1, 1983 - June 30, 1984)

Target Group		Certifications
	Number	Percent
Youth, Economically		
Disadvantaged	235,766	61.5
Vietnam Veterans,	•	
Economically		
Disadvantaged	21,904	5.7
Ex-convicts, Economically		
Disadvantaged	19,924	5.2
Vocational		•
Rehabilitation	27,644	7.2
General Assistance		•
Recipients	16,789	4.4
	10,100	
Supplemental Security		
Income Recipients	1,094	0.2
1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5		
AFDC Recipients	60,620	15.8
		•
<u>TOTAL</u>	383,541	1/ 100.0

 $[\]underline{1}$ / Does not include 13,110 summer youth certifications.

Demographic Characteristics of Certified Individuals First Three Quarters FY 1983 TJTC

	Percent of Total
Demographic Characteristics	1983
Male	55.8
Female	44.2
16-18 Years Old	14.3
19-24 Years Old	61.4
25-34 Years Old	17.0
35 Years Old or Over	7.3
White, Not Hispanic	57.9
Black, Not Hispanic	30.1
Hispanic	8.8
American Indian/Alaskan Native	0.6
Asian or Pacific Islander	2.6

Attachment 3

Occupations of Certified Individuals
First Three Quarters FY 1983
... TJTC

Occupational Groups	Percent of Total 1983
Professional, Managerial, Technical	, 2.1
Clerical and Sales	18.6
Service	40.8
Farming, Forestry, Fishery	2.4
Processing	4.9
Machine Trades	5.0
Benchwork 1/	7.6
Structural	5.4
Miscellaneous	13.2
TOTAL	100.0

^{1/} Includes assembling, grinding, and drilling.

Proposed Legislation in the 98th Congress to add additional target groups to TJTC

<u>Bill</u>	Sponsors	Target Groups
H.R. 2127	Kennelly Ferraro	Displaced homemakers
H.R. 2180	Rinaldo	Economically disadvantaged, aged 55 or older
H.R. 3211	Hammerschmidt	Handicapped individuals (added to WIN tax credit)
H.R. 3414	Seiberling	Economically disadvantaged, delinquent youth (16-18)
H.R. 4208	Bilirakis	Displaced homemakers
H.R. 4949	Mazzoli	Displaced homemakers
S. 371	Sasser, Nunn Levin, Johnston, Pressler	Individuals unemployed one year or who have exhausted unemployment benefits
S. 1753	Cranston	Low income older workers (65 or older)
S. 2431	Helms, Domenici, Thurmond	Food Stamp recipients

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 11, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

FROM:

THE WORKING GROUP ON EMPLOYMENT POLICY

SUBJECT:

Summer Youth Employment and Training Program

Fund Distribution

Issue: How can the Administration better target Summer Youth Employment and Training Program funds to areas with the greatest need?

The Summer Youth Employment and Training Program (SYETP) is designed to subsidize minimum wage public sector summer jobs for economically disadvantaged youth between the ages of 14 and 21.

Because of certain provisions in the distribution formula, large cities faced significant funding reductions in 1984. As a result, Congress appropriated an additional \$100 million in both the 1984 and 1985 program years to make up for the potential shortfall.

Large cities typically have more youth who would be eligible for the program and relatively fewer unsubsidized jobs available than suburban and rural areas. Unless the distribution formula is changed, areas with the greatest need will receive inadequate funding, while areas with less need will receive more funding.

Background

Summer youth employment programs began with the Neighborhood Youth Corps, authorized by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Initially, the summer program operated in a small number of cities and its purpose was to provide short-term, part-time jobs to in-school youth living in areas with few private sector jobs. The implicit objectives of the program were to: a) give unemployed youth something to do during the summer months; and b) provide these youth with an opportunity to earn a paycheck. There was little emphasis on providing youth with marketable skills for later entry into the job market.

In 1973, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) consolidated a variety of categorical programs into one system of Federal, State, and local programs targeted primarily at economically disadvantaged individuals. While previous summer youth programs concentrated their efforts in urban labor markets, CETA spread these efforts nationwide. Summer youth programs were initiated in many smaller cities, suburban jurisdictions, and

rural areas. Appropriations for summer youth programs began to increase rapidly from \$305 million in 1974 to \$839 million in 1981.

In 1982, the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) reauthorized the summer youth programs, calling them the Summer Youth Employment and Training Program. The targeting and service provisions in the program are essentially the same as those in the programs that existed under CETA.

The program restricts eligibility to economically disadvantaged youth and the services include: work experience, basic and remedial education, skill training, employment counseling, and supportive services. The predominant activity remains work experience, i.e., part-time jobs in public or non-profit agencies. The type of work includes general maintenance and clean-up, simple clerical, and other low-skill activities. Appropriations for FY 1985 total about \$825 million. Prior funding and participation levels are found at Attachment 1.

Definitive impact evaluations have not been conducted on the summer youth programs. Analysts generally agree that, absent any emphasis on the development of the youth's basic skills and competencies, the programs have done little, if anything, to improve the long-term earnings and employment of participants. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the summer youth programs provided more job opportunities in some areas than those that would have been present in the absence of the programs. However, job opportunities in inner city areas have been declining over time and it is probable that summer youth programs have created new jobs in those areas.

Distribution Formula

Under JTPA, the Federal Government distributes funds to the States, which in turn distribute funds among approximately 600 Service Delivery Areas. These are local units of general government, or consortia of such units, that are responsible for program delivery.

The distribution of funds to the States is subject to a 90 percent hold-harmless provision, i.e., each State receives at least 90 percent of its previous year's allocation. There is no comparable hold-harmless provision in JTPA for the distribution of funds from the States to the Service Delivery Areas.

Since JTPA uses a different distribution formula from that used in CETA and does not use a hold-harmless provision at the Service Delivery Area level, many areas could have experienced in 1984 significant funding reductions from the levels they received under CETA.

These reductions would have been especially severe in larger cities where large numbers of eligible youth reside and relatively fewer unsubsidized jobs are available.

To avoid these potential shortfalls, Congress appropriated an additional \$100 million for both the 1984 and 1985, summer programs. These supplemental funds are to be used, to the extent possible, to keep local summer youth funding at the same levels as those under CETA. In 1984, about one-half of the \$100 million supplemental was provided to the 50 largest cities.

At the same time the JTPA distribution formula reduced resources to the urban areas, the formula expanded resources for suburban and rural areas which tend to have proportionately smaller numbers of eligible youth and more unsubsidized jobs. Initial estimates indicate that a substantial amount of the 1984 summer program funds were unused. These estimates indicate that 18 percent, or \$150 million of the \$825 million available, was unused in 1984. An estimated 150,000 job opportunities may have been lost this past summer.

While these unused funds can be used in future years, they cannot be reallocated among jurisdictions. Unless the JPTA distribution formula is changed, areas most in need will continue to receive relatively less funding than those areas with less need.

Policy Considerations

There are a number of policy objectives the Summer Youth Program should attempt to meet:

- Provide job training. Although most of the jobs provide youth earnings and activities in which to engage during the summer, analysts generally agree that the program does little to improve the long-term earnings and employment of participants. To provide youth more than a temporary job, the program should include actual training to develop job skills and work habits.
- Target resources to those areas with greatest need. The current distribution formula is based on aggregate unemployment and poverty data for both adults and youth. The formula does not necessarily distribute funds effectively toward those areas with youth who are most likely to benefit from it. In fact, these youth are concentrated in urban areas with high rates of joblessness and high concentrations of economically disadvantaged.

Any attempt to develop a formula that distributes funds more effectively toward needy youth will be limited by currently available labor market data. Statistics on total youth unemployment are available by State but not by specific age category, or by minority or disadvantaged status. Moreover, data at both the State and local levels do not reflect timely or accurate changes in the youth labor force and youth unemployment. Therefore, it will be difficult to identify those areas which have the proportionately largest numbers of youth who are unemployed or disadvantaged.

Assure that the program size is commensurate with the size of the youth population. Bureau of Labor Statistics data show that the youth population has declined since 1978. For example, the number of youth aged 16-19 in the labor force declined from 9.7 million in 1978 to 8.2 million in 1983. Likewise, the minority youth population has declined in size as shown in Attachments 2 and 3. Youth unemployment has leveled off and begun to decline in many areas.

The Federal Government should review whether the size of the Summer Youth Program should be adjusted to accommodate this demographic shift.

Allow jurisdictions to adjust gradually to funding changes. Because of the absence of a hold-harmless provision in JTPA at the Service Delivery Area level, local areas can experience substantial year-to-year shifts in funding. Not only can substantial annual changes make it difficult for local areas to adjust their programs, substantial reductions in funding can significantly increase the political pressures for increased appropriations.

Policy Options

The Working Group has developed three options for addressing the deficiencies in the current Summer Youth Program distribution formula.

Option 1: Maintain the status quo by continuing to use the current distribution formula without adjustment.

Advantage

o Maintaining the status quo would eliminate the need for Congressional action and opening up JTPA, which risks unnecessary funding increases.

Disadvantage

o There will continue to be strong pressure on the Congress to appropriate additional funds to compensate for the relatively low funding to urban areas with greater need.

Option. 2: Retarget funds to large urban areas through:

- A. Using the current distribution formula, but raising the threshold levels for "areas of substantial unemployment" (to an unemployment rate of 10 percent) and "excess unemployment" (to the level of the annual average national unemployment rate).
- B. Targeting funds in a manner similar to A., but using data specific to youth, instead of aggregate data which includes both adult and youth, to determine the areas with the greatest proportion of unemployed and economically disadvantaged individuals.
- C. Using the current distribution formula, but permitting Governors to apply the 90 percent hold-harmless provision to allocations of funds to Service Delivery Areas.

Advantages

- o Raising the threshold levels in the distribution formula would increase the proportion of funds directed to those areas with the most unemployment.
- o Since urban areas would tend to receive more funding under these criteria, there would be less pressure on the Congress to provide supplemental funding to compensate for the shortfall to urban areas.
- o This option would provide an opportunity to reduce program appropriations since raising the threshold levels would direct resources more accurately, enabling the program to meet employment needs in more areas with fewer dollars.
- Targeting funds to large urban areas by using data specific to youth would more effectively target resources toward those areas with high youth unemployment, rather than areas with high unemployment, in general.

Applying the hold-harmless provision at the area level would avoid program disruption in both the losing and gaining areas, permitting them to adjust gradually.

<u>Disadv</u>antages

- Raising the threshold levels without using data specific to youth would still not necessarily target most resources toward those areas with the highest youth unemployment rates.
- o Because of limitations in currently available labor market data, it will be difficult to identify those areas which have the proportionately largest numbers of youth who are unemployed and/or disadvantaged.
- o Proposing these changes in the program would require legislation, which would open up consideration of JTPA and risk unnecessary funding increases.
- Option 3: Merge the Summer Youth Program with the basic JTPA block grant, which authorizes the full spectrum of training and employment services for adults and youth.

Advantages

- O This would permit Governors and Service Delivery Areas to address summer youth employment in the way they deem most appropriate.
- o Preliminary data suggests that the basic block grant program is effective in placing participants in private sector jobs. Given the lack of skill training in the current Summer Youth Program, it is unlikely that it will significantly improve the long-term employment and earnings prospects of participants. By contrast, at least 70 percent of the block grant's funding must be used for training.
- Merging the Summer Youth Program with the basic block grant would likely reduce administrative costs.

Disadvantages

o Proposing a merger may result in Congress both continuing funding of the Summer Youth Program and increasing funding of the block grant program.

- Unless the formula for the basic block grant program is modified, funds would not necessarily be targeted toward areas with the greatest youth unemployment needs.
- o Merging the two programs could result in less funding for summer employment when youth unemployment is greatest, if Governors and Service Delivery Areas do not allocate sufficient funds for summer employment.

CALENDAR YEAR SUMMER PROGRAM FUNDING AND PARTICIPANT LEVELS

Calendar Year	Funding Levels (millions)	Participants
1985a	824.5	817,200
1984ª	824.5	817,200
1983	824.5	813,200
1982	674.6	683,198
1981	839.0	776,717
1980	608.6	855,700
1979	785.2	882,700
1973	756.0	898,566
1977	595.0	907,193
1976	529.4	1,131,600 ^b
1975	473.4	941,598
1974	305.6	862,502
1973	222.0	913,900
1972	332.2	759,361
1971	257.9	602,200
1970	185.5	461,700
1969	148.0	423,300
1968	126.8	360,000
1967	133.3	261,700
1966	121.1	182,800
1965	N/A	114,500

^aThese represent approved budget levels for 1984 and 1985; participant levels are projections based on estimated participant unit costs.

bIncludes FY 1976 transition quarter.

N/A - Not Available.

EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN MONIMISTITUTIONAL POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX, 1970-1983

and 15 Year Olds	Civilian Moninst. Population (000)	Civilian - Labor Force (COO)	Participation Rate	Employment (000)	Unemploy- ment (000)	Unemploy- ment Rate	Not in Labor Force (000)
1970 1971 1972 1973	7983 8122 8299 8342	1530 1566 1613 1672	19 - 2 12 - 3 19 - 4 20 - 0	1362 1383 1417 1481	168 183 192 190	11.0 11.7 11.9 11.4	6454 6563 6689 6673
1974 1975 1976 1977	8447 8491 8482 8359	1703 1631 1636 1646	- 20.2 - 19.2 - 18.3 - 20.3	1479 1396 1363 1485	230 235 238 263	12.4 14.4 14.8 15.0	6740 6861 6876 6612
1973 1979	9227 8009	1765 1639	21.5	1492	274 253	15.5	6461 6369
1980 1981 1982 1983	7672 7370 7170 7181	1413 1202 1233 1190	18.5 17.5 17.2 16.6	1193 1078 1025 992	226 214 208 199	15.3 10.5 16.3 16.5	6254 () 6019 5937 5990
Jaco 13 Year Olds		•				,	•
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977	14519 15622 15510 15640 16180 16418 16614 16668 16695	7249 7470 8084 8871 8870 9086 9388 9652 9658	43.2 43.7 53.7 54.3 54.3 54.3 55.3 57.3	6144 6209 6246 7271 7448 7104 7336 7668 8070 8083	1106 1262 1308 1235 1422 1767 1719 1663 1583	15.3 16.3 14.5 16.3 19.3 13.5 15.4	7270 7552 7456 7333 7348 7556 7327 7043 7019
1980 1981 1982 1983	16543 16214 15763 15274	9373 1995 1926 3171	50.7 15.4 54.1 53.5	7710 7225 6549 6342	1669 1763 1977 1829	17. * 13. 22. * 22. *	7165
to-24 Year Olds						•	
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978	15323 16345 17143 17692 17994 18595 19109 19582 20007	10507 11331 1213. 12340 13314 13770 14234 14425 1337	03.2 09.3 71.3 72.0 74.3 74.3 75.7 76.3	9731 10201 11009 11039 12101 11665 12570 13196 13867 14327	266 1130 1132 1005 1212 1865 1714 1619 1433 1442		114 144 144 1445 1445 145 145 145 145
1980 1981 1982 1983	20633 20829 20843 2013#	18 1.2 16 1.2 16 1.2 16 1.2	77.2 77.2 77.2	14187 14102 13403 13702	1935 1976 2302 2331	· :	.112 .121 .133

Attachment 3

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1970 1129 147 13.0 104 44 1 1158 136 11.7 00 44 2 1204 146 12.1 95 50 3 1232 129 10.4 83 46 4 1294 155 12.0 98 58 5 1316 140 10.6 84 56 6	29.9 32.6 34.5	NILE
1970 1129 147 13.0 104 44 1 1158 136 11.7 90 44 2 1204 146 12.1 95 50 3 1232 129 10.4 83 46 4 1294 155 12.0 98 58 5 1316 140 10.6 84 56 6 1336 133 10.3 79 59	32.6 34.5	 982
1 1158 136 11.7 00 44 2 1204 146 12.1 95 50 3 1232 129 10.4 83 46 4 1294 155 12.0 98 58 5 1316 140 10.6 84 56 6	32.6 34.5	9 82
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4 1294 155 12.0 98 58 5 1316 140 10.6 84 56 6 6 1336 133 10.3 79 59	35.4	1103
6 1336 133 10.3 79 59	37.2	1139
	10.0	1177
_	42.3	1139
7 133A 145 10.8 85 60 -	41.6	1193
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t 1284 115 9.0 65 49 s	12.6	1169
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16 to 19 Year Olds		
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^{*} For these years data represents 31 edgs only discreminanties; for other years the data reflects 31 edgs only.